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The collision between an increasing number of multinational
arbitrations and an increasing number of multinational insolvencies
constitutes the irresistible force meeting the immoveable object. In many
countries, an insolvency proceeding overrides most other laws and
sweeps into its embrace virtually all legal matters relating to the debtor.
Yet international arbitration as embodied in the United Nations
Convention 2 has achieved a highly favored state of enforcement around
the world?.
1. Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas. I am
grateful to Alexander Savage, Texas '11, and Omar Ochoa, Texas '11, for research
assistance with this paper and to Riz Mokal for insights into English law. Any mistakes
are all mine.
2. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention]. In the United States, the legislation applying the Convention is Chapter 2
of Title 9 of the United States Code. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2011).
3. Jay L. Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and
Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REv. 595, 616-17 (1983) [hereinafter Westbrook, Coming
Encounter]. This article often refers to the court in country A, the place of arbitration,
the "local" court, which applies local law, while the insolvency proceeding in country B
is, for the purposes of this article, assumed to be the "main" proceeding under both the
European Insolvency Regulation and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. See
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This paper considers two aspects of the difficulties thus created.
First we should determine the best domestic rule to reconcile the
conflicting demands of the insolvency system and the international
commercial arbitration system. That is, in an international case in which
the debtor had committed to arbitration of disputes arising from a
contract,
a) Should a pending arbitration be halted, even temporarily, upon
the opening of the insolvency proceeding?
b) Should the contractual claims be resolved in arbitration, rather
than in the insolvency claims-resolution procedures?
The rule a country adopts to govern those choices may be called the
country's "claims-arbitration" rule. In a cross-border case, the challenge
is to develop the proper choice-of-law rule to determine which country's
claims-arbitration rule should apply in a given case. For example, when
a court in Country A (often the place of arbitration) is asked to determine
what claims-arbitration rule it will apply with regard to a debtor that is in
an insolvency proceeding in Country B, should it choose its own claimsarbitration rule or the rule that would be applied by the insolvency court
in Country B? 4 This issue came before two European courts as to the
same debtor, with opposite results.

Council Regulation 1346/2000, European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:32000R1346:EN:NOT [hereinafter EU Regulation]; UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158
(Dec. 15, 1997), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/
insolvency-e.pdf [hereinafter Model Law].
4. My focus is on insolvency proceedings involving multinational businesses and
arbitration clauses and awards that are subject to the New York Convention. See New
York Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. A country might or might not apply a different
rule to pre-insolvency arbitration clauses that are purely domestic-that is, that involve
only domestic parties and a local place of arbitration. Cf Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.
Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (enforcing arbitration award where arbitration
proceeding would have been voided as violating the automatic stay if the place of
arbitration had been in the United States). The present subject is sufficiently complex
that I will not go into the possible differences in policy considerations as to enforcement
in insolvency of a purely local arbitration clause or award, although most of the United
States cases I discuss are domestic cases. I addressed the domestic-foreign distinction at
length some years ago, and I hope soon to return to it. See Westbrook, Coming
Encounter, supra note 3. Fotochrome is an old case, and it might not be applied today.
Cf Societe Nationale Algerienne pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la
Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R.
606, 613-14 (D. Mass. 1987) (exercising discretion to enforce international arbitration
clause where no significant bankruptcy issues were involved).
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Elektrim was a Polish company that became involved in a
staggering morass of litigation and arbitration throughout the first decade
of the new century. 5 Vivendi, a venture partner of Elektrim, launched an
arbitration proceeding against the Polish concern in London. Shortly
before the first hearing in the arbitration, an insolvency proceeding for
Elektrim was opened in Poland. The administrator of the insolvency
took the position that Polish insolvency law abrogated the arbitration
clause in the contract between the parties, leaving the matter to be
resolved in court. Vivendi claimed the status of the arbitration was
governed by English law, which would not halt the arbitration. The
arbitration tribunal rejected the administrator's request for dismissal of
the arbitration and went forward to hold hearings and issue an award.
The United Kingdom courts upheld the tribunal, ruling that the European
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 6 allocated the decision about the
arbitration to the law of the country where the arbitration was pending.7
Under English law the arbitration was permitted to go forward, even
though the court recognized that the Polish proceeding was the "main"
proceeding under the EU Regulation and that Polish law would hold the
arbitration clause extinguished by the insolvency. A second English
case, decided since the IACCL conference in Toronto, reached the same
sort of result under the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 8 albeit
with a more nuanced approach.9
Elektrim was involved in a second arbitration, in Switzerland.10
The Swiss arbitral tribunal ruled that Polish law controlled and dismissed
Elektrim from the multiparty arbitration. The Swiss Supreme Court
agreed. While the Polish insolvency rules did not operate directly in
Switzerland, under Swiss conflicts principles, the law of the insolvency
jurisdiction should control and, thus, the arbitration should be halted as
5. For a discussion of the morass, see Law Debenture Trust Corp. Plc v. Elektrim
SA, (2009) EWHC 1801 (Ch).
6. See EU Regulation, supra note 3.
7. Syska v. Vivendi Universal SA, [2010] B.C.C. 348. The decision was limited to
a pending arbitration. See Ian Fletcher, Effects on Arbitration Proceedings of the EU
Regulation, 22 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 60, 60-61 (2009).

8. Model Law, supra note 3.
9. Cosco Bulk Carrier Co. Ltd. v. Armada Shipping S.A. (In re Armada Shipping
S.A.), [2011] EWHC 216 (Ch). See the discussion in note 40 concerning the Armada
court's approach.
10. Vivendi S.A. v. Deutsche Telekom A.G. (Elektrim), Bundesgericht [BGer]
[Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 31, 2009, 4A 428/2008, ASA Bulletin 1/2010 at 104
(Switz.) [hereinafter Elektrim]. See, e.g., Martin Aebi & Harold Frey, Impact of
Bankruptcy on InternationalArbitration Proceedings:A Special Case Does Not Make a
General Rule, 28 ASA BULLETIN 113 (2010) (hereinafter Special Case); Frank
Spoorenberg and Isabelle Fellrath, Switzerland: The Uneasy Relationship Between
Arbitration And Bankruptcy,

article.asp?articleid=83270.
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against the insolvent debtor. Thus, the two cases involving the debtor
Elektrim reached opposite results.
Needless to say, it is not for me to opine about the proper
interpretation of English law, Polish law, Swiss law, or the EU
Regulation." The results just described may or may not have been
correct under the relevant laws. My concern is to take the Elektrim cases
as hypothetical examples to explore the choice-of-law rules explicitly or
implicitly adopted in these cases and to consider which of them would
make the best sense from a policy point of view if we were free to amend
all applicable laws to produce the best results.
ARBITRATION AND THE INSOLVENCY CLAIMS PROCESS

We should begin by considering insolvency-court rules for
adjudicating claims that would normally be subject to arbitration. As we
have seen, in Elektrim the court assumed that UK law required that the
claims be resolved in arbitration, while the Polish law, applied in
Switzerland, sent the parties to the claims process in the insolvency
court. These claims-arbitration rules address two questions: shall an
arbitration be permitted to commence or go forward after an insolvency
proceeding has begun, and if it does, should its results be conclusive and
enforceable?
Most national insolvency laws impose a moratorium to halt
domestic lawsuits and often arbitrations as well when an insolvency
proceeding is brought.12 Many countries claim their moratorium extends
to the debtor's property all over the world, increasing the importance of
being able to identify the claims-arbitration rule that applies.' 3
In most countries, however, there is a dearth of authority
determining whether the claim will ultimately be resolved in arbitration,
with the award being conclusive in the insolvency case on the merits of
the parties' dispute. Few countries have a statutory rule on this question,

11. The wisdom of modesty in this regard is illustrated by the fact that the Warsaw
Court of Appeals may have overruled a lower court decision that the Elektrim arbitration
award was not enforceable in the Polish bankruptcy. See Special Case, supra note 10, at
n.41. I do not attempt in this paper to probe further Polish law in that regard.
12. See generally Jonathan Sutcliffe and James Rogers, Effect Of Party Insolvency
On ArbitrationProceedings: Pause For Thought In Testing Times, 76 ARB. 277 (2010).
There are some countries-for example, Mexico-where lawsuits are not halted, but are
permitted to continue and to produce results binding in the insolvency court on the merits
of claims. AM. L. INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE
NAFTA COUNTRIES, INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (2003).
13. See AM. L. INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION

AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 50, n.91 (2003). But see Fotochrome, supra note 4, at
516-17 (requiring in personam jurisdiction over a foreign party before the stay has any
effect).
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but some common-law countries have begun to generate case law
approaches. In the United States, for example, a rule is emerging that
usually enforces arbitration clauses against the debtor's bankrupt estate
(and therefore against its creditors) 14 but creates certain categories of
legal issues where the court may not enforce arbitration. 5 As to these
categories (usually "core" cases involving claims peculiar to insolvency),
some cases have held that the judicial claims process should be used,
rather than the arbitration process, while others have said the court has
discretion to choose one or the other, depending on the circumstances.16
The US cases have shown a disinclination to distinguish between
domestic and international arbitration in applying these rules.' 7
In Elektrim, the English court did not discuss the English claimsarbitration rule, but seemed to assume that an arbitration proceeding
would routinely be completed and its award enforced despite a party's
having entered an insolvency proceeding.' 8 On the other hand, Armada,
a more recent UK case, adopts a flexible rule somewhat like the United
States approach just described.19
Powerful policies favor enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards, whether local or international. These policies are especially
important in the international arena. The most important benefit of
international arbitration is neutrality of forum. 20 That advantage is lost if
the counterparty is forced in the case of insolvency to give up its right to
neutral arbitration. Another pillar of the policy supporting international
14. The United States is an example of a country that provides for a broad stay of all
lawsuits and arbitrations, at least temporarily, unless the court decides to permit them to
go forward. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
15. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in
Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 183 (2007) (calling for a general rule of
nonenforceability of arbitration clauses in "core" bankruptcy proceedings); Michael D.
Fielding, ElevatingBusiness Above The Constitution:Arbitration andBankruptcy Proofs
of Claim, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 563, 568 (2008). See generally COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY

§ 9019.95

(2010).

16. See, e.g., In Re White Mountain Mining Company, L.L.C., 403 F.3d 164 (4th
Cir. 2005) (international arbitration clause refused enforcement in core proceeding); In re
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1066 (5th Cir. 1997) (dening enforcement of
arbitration clause but finding bankruptcy court discretion in all core cases). See generally
Note, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Test Case for Implied Repeal of the
FederalArbitrationAct, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2307 (2004) (discussing cases decided
each way).
17. Id.
18. See Syska v. Vivendi Universal SA, [2010] B.C.C. 348, 352.
19. Oddly, the judgment in Armada does not cite Elektrim, yet the two cases are
quite similar in facts and issues presented, despite the inapplicability of the EU

Regulation in Armada.
20. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 401
(3d ed. 2006). See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 988 (3d ed. 1996).
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arbitration is the predictability it provides for commercial transactions.
The parties to an arbitration clause know it will almost always be given
effect, and that quality gives it a great deal of commercial value.
International arbitration policy is embodied in the New York
Convention, perhaps the most successful commercial convention of
modem times. It is presently in force in some 145 countrieS2 1 and has
produced a high level of enforcement around the world.22 However, in
the insolvency area a country has the option of refusing enforcement
against the debtor company under the Convention. The Convention
offers a defense of "incapacity." To quote a prior work of mine:
Article V(1)(a) authorizes nonenforcement if "[t]he parties to the
agreement ... were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity . . . ." Although this exception, on its face, seems to refer

to the parties' capacity at the time the arbitration agreement was
made, rather than to their capacity at the time of the arbitration
proceedings, the background of the provision suggests that the
drafters were concerned with ensuring that both parties be properly
represented during the arbitration proceeding; therefore, the provision
refers to the parties' capacity at the time of arbitration. [footnotes
omitted]23
The Swiss Supreme Court relied upon just this sort of analysis in holding
that Elektrim had lost its capacity to arbitrate under Polish law once its
insolvency proceeding had been opened.24
The fact that the Convention can be understood to permit a defense
to arbitration does not determine which result is the best policy.
Certain important requirements of insolvency procedures must be
balanced against the benefits of arbitration. These requirements are
closely related to the purposes of insolvency law. It is the essence of
insolvency law that each creditor sacrifices many rights for the collective
benefit of the creditor body, especially in a reorganization case.
21. See Status of Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
available at
COLLECTION,
TREATY
NATIONS
UNrrED
Awards,
Arbitral
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=
XXII-l&chapter-22&lang=en (last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (listing countries that have
ratified the New York Convention).
22. Id. See also LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 401.
23. See Westbrook, Coming Encounter, supra note 3, at 614-15.
24. See Elektrim, supra note 10. At least one author criticizes the idea that
insolvency creates an incapacity under the terms of the Convention. He would look at the
proper "characterization" of the issue instead. Mark Robertson, Cross-BorderInsolvency
And InternationalCommercial Arbitration: CharacterizationAnd Choice Of Law Issues
In Light Of Elektrim S.A. V Vivendi S.A. And Analysis Of The European Insolvency
Regulation, 12 INT'L ARB. L.R. 125-135 (2009). I would disagree, as would Professor
Weintraub, seeing that approach as a label for a result
See R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 2006).
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Insolvency claims procedures are often "summary" in nature. That is,
they are designed in the interests of economy to resolve contentious
claims more quickly and inexpensively than would the normal processes
of litigation or arbitration. While that means the result may be "rough
justice" as compared with more elaborate procedures, a less robust but
less expensive procedure often makes sense when there is not enough
value available to satisfy most claims in full and a relatively quick result
is important to permit distributions to creditors at the earliest time. In
addition, certain claims are unique to insolvency law. The Paulian
(avoidance) actions are the most obvious examples. These sorts of
claims are often intertwined with contract claims in disputes over
commercial transactions.
The avoidance of expense and delay in the insolvency claims
process has a special impact on the desirability of enforcing arbitration in
multinational insolvency cases. International commercial arbitration is
very expensive and often very slow. 25 Whatever the virtues of domestic
arbitrations in saving litigation costs, international arbitrations are
notoriously expensive, perhaps even more expensive than court
procedures, and they often drag on for years. Thus in the international
context, the argument for preferring court procedures on grounds of
reduced expense and delay is enhanced.
Although various measures in an insolvency case may enhance
value for all creditors, expenditures that benefit only one creditor or
group of creditors necessarily reduce the recoveries of others. In that
context, enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award is a priority in
favor of the counterparty to that contract over all other unsecured
creditors who are consigned to the court process. 26 An illustration with
concrete figures makes this clear.
If court resolution of the
counterparty's claim would cost $50,000 of the assets available to the
administrator, and arbitration costs $100,000, then the counterparty has
been preferred to the extent of $50,000, and the other creditors have lost
their share of that amount. Given that equality is the central principle of
bankruptcy distribution, the granting of an implicit priority to one
general creditor over another should require a powerful justification.
The virtues of predictability are especially important in international
cases. As noted above, predictability is greatly improved as between the
parties to multinational transactions by the presence of an arbitration
25. See, e.g., Anibal Sabater, A New Landscape, EXPERIENCE 35 (ABA
2010); Lorraine M. Brennan, Russ Bleemer, Andrew J. Gange, Recent

Developments In International Commercial Arbitration, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MAGAZINE 14 (ABA 2009); Samuel V. Goekjian, The Conduct of International
Arbitration,2 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 409 (1979).
26. Of course, a counterparty could be secured, but usually is not.
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clause in a contract. However, arbitration does not provide transparent
predictability to other creditors of the debtor counterparty. A decision to
enforce arbitration will affect hundreds or even thousands of parties-the
other creditors of the debtor-who entered into contracts with the debtor
without knowing what choices the debtor has made concerning
arbitration. By contrast, the claims process in insolvency court is easily
predictable. In the case of an international contract, the counterparty to
the arbitration contract has a fairly strong chance of predicting the
"center of main interests" ("COMI") of the future debtor, which is the
place where a main insolvency proceeding would be opened. The ease
of predicting a company's COMI leads to a greater likelihood that all
creditors will be able to predict the claims-arbitration rule to be applied.
Thus, the counterparty that enters into a contract with a corporation
headquartered in Country B will be able to have its lawyers ascertain the
rules concerning enforceability of arbitration clauses under the
insolvency laws of Country B. In the example under discussion where
the other contract party is a Polish company, the counterparty would
know that its arbitration rights would not be enforced if the Polish
concern entered an insolvency proceeding. That would also be the
expectation of others who deal with the Country B company and have a
concern about its financial circumstances.
However, even where these factors influence a court to deny effect
to the arbitration clauses or arbitration awards, the best result may be
different in some cases in which either arbitration or local litigation cases
may have proceeded close to resolution by the time the insolvency
proceeding is opened, as may have been true in Elektrim. Where that is
true, the expense and delay of redoing a claims process almost completed
may be greater than permitting the pending arbitration to be finished and
an award entered.
These variables may provide some support for a discretionary rule
like that emerging in some cases in the United States, because such a rule
enables a court to choose one process or the other as suits the particular
case. It also provides a mechanism whereby the party seeking arbitration
and the tribunal itself might usefully influence the result by offering to
finish the arbitration by a certain date at a fixed expense. Of course, such
a rule also requires giving substantial discretion to the court, which some
will find undesirable or inconsistent with existing legal regimes. On the
other hand, the Polish rule greatly enhances predictability and in a highly
the insolvency claims procedure of the main
transparent way:
proceeding would always be used in lieu of arbitration, a result in case of
insolvency that the contract parties and the other creditors could include
in the calculation of their pricing and terms.

2011] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MULTINATIONAL INSOLVENCY

643

CHOICE-OF-LAW
Territorialismand Universalism

A brief overview of theories of multinational insolvency will put the
choice-of-law issues in context. Territorialism and universalism are the
terms used to describe the two approaches to multinational insolvency
matters. Territorialism is the traditional "grab rule," wherein each
national court seizes what property it can and distributes its proceeds
under local law. Universalism is based on the idea that an effective
insolvency law, operating in rem as to hundreds or even thousands of
claimants, must have a legal reach coextensive with the market.27
Therefore, in a globalizing world we would ideally have one proceeding
for a multinational company that would realize upon its assets and
distribute the resulting value globally, whether by way of liquidation or
reorganization.28 Given the difficulties of achieving the ideal in a world
of nation states, a notion of modified universalism has achieved
considerable support.29 TIt issn understood as a pragmatic doctrine that
seeks to achieve practical results that approach so far as possible those
that would obtain in a pure universalist system. The logic of modified
universalism tends in general to favor choice-of-law rules that apply the
law of the "main" insolvency proceeding in many circumstances. The
EU Regulation adopts that approach, although with many important
30
exceptions.
The Choice ofLaw Questions

In principle, there are no fewer than three choice-of-law questions
that arise from the facts in the two Elektrim cases: the applicable
insolvency law, the law applicable to halting the arbitration, and the law
governing the ultimate enforceability of the arbitration agreement or
award, in the insolvency court or elsewhere.

27. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 2276 (2000).
28. See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIEs 8
(2003); Model Law, supra note 3.
29. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in
International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2217 (2000) (opponent of
universalism states that Model Law essentially adopts that approach).
30. See EU Regulation, supra note 3, at arts. 4, 15, 17-18, 27.
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APPLICABLE INSOLVENCY LAW

The first question seems easy enough in the Elektrim case. On the
facts, the Polish proceeding seemed clearly to be the "main" proceeding
as that term would be used under the European Regulation or the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency ("Model Law").3 1 In any event, there
was no other pending insolvency proceeding, so there was no other
insolvency law to be applied. Thus the first question is answered easily
in both Elektrim cases: Poland provides the applicable insolvency law.
32
That leaves the two questions related to the claims process.
APPLICABLE CLAIMS-ARBITRATION RULE

In a fully universalist system of the management of multinational
insolvencies, the arbitration clause would be abrogated by the single
applicable insolvency law, and the effect would be as if a Polish
insolvency moratorium (or stay) was applied to halt the arbitration and to
require litigation of the claim in the insolvency court. Conversely, in a
fully traditional, territorialist jurisdiction, the answers to the claimsarbitration questions would be equally easy. The Polish insolvency case
would have no effect locally, and the arbitration agreement and any
resulting award would be enforceable in the local court at the place of
arbitration and perhaps elsewhere, but not in the insolvency court.
However, in the world of modified universalism as reflected in both
the European Regulation and the Model Law, 33 the local court 34 has an
important role to play in answering the two claims-arbitration
questions. 35 First, it must decide whether to halt the arbitration in light of
the insolvency. Is that decision governed by local law or the law of the
insolvency court? That is the first claims-arbitration issue. In the
English Elektrim case, the court found that the European Regulation
31. It appears that the English version of the Model Law was not applicable to the
case.
32. Similarly in Armada, it was clear that the Swiss insolvency law was the only one
plausibly applicable.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. Depending on the state of the arbitration proceeding and the circumstances of the
insolvency proceeding, it will often be proper to apply to the arbitral tribunal in the first
instance to request a stay or dismissal of the arbitration. That was done in both the
Elektrim cases. For ease of expression, I will refer instead to the local court at the place
of arbitration, which is where the insolvency administrator must turn if the tribunal
refuses the request.
35. There is also an important choice-of-forum issue here. Should the choice-of-law
questions and the underlying merits of the claims-process issues be decided by the local
court, or should the local court defer to the insolvency court? This paper does not
address that problem, although the author would argue that the insolvency court is
generally the preferred forum for that decision. This area is one of many in multinational
insolvency law where choice of law and choice of forum are intertwined.
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allocated that issue to the local law and therefore applied English law to
determine if the arbitration should have been halted, even temporarily. 36
Second, the court must decide if the arbitration should be permitted to
resolve the merits of the claim.
CASE MANAGEMENT

The English court in Elektrim assumed the arbitration had not been
stayed, so the award made after the opening of the Polish insolvency was
not in violation of any applicable stay order. The decision thus ignored
the question of a temporary stay. 37 That question is a matter of case
management-aiming for maximization of value and accuracy of result.
If a lawsuit or arbitration continues after an insolvency proceeding is
brought, there is a serious risk it will not be well defended (or
prosecuted), especially if a trustee or administrator has just been
appointed, which is still the procedure in most kinds of insolvency
proceedings in most countries. Indeed, experience in insolvency matters
shows that the prior conduct of a lawsuit or arbitration may have been
neglected by a corporate leadership caught in the turmoil of financial
crisis. Thus the debtor's case may be weakened already when control of
the debtor is assumed by an administrator unfamiliar with the matter and
distracted by a host of other pressing concerns.
The consequence of an arbitration thus neglected is that deadlines
may be missed, defaults may be entered, and some important arguments
on the merits may not be made or may be made badly. Lawyers may
be unpaid and uninstructed, circumstances notoriously inconsistent with
legal success. Preparation for a key hearing may be hasty and
incomplete. If the result is that a claim is honored that would have been
rejected in the normal contentious process or if the claim is awarded at
an amount far higher than merited, then the other creditors of the debtor
36. Interestingly, it appears that an arbitration would be stayed in England upon the
filing of a winding up or an administration proceeding. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45,
§ 130(2); sch. Bl 43(6). The UK court did not look to its insolvency rule for this
purpose, although one might have thought that law would be the obvious one to apply. A
different rule applied under the Model Law as adopted in England. See Armada. On the
other hand, the arbitration would apparently not be stayed if the creditor were secured.
See Armada 49.
37. By contrast, the court in Armada was directed to the local insolvency law by the
provisions of the Model Law, and it was therefore conceded that the arbitration involving
the debtor was stayed upon recognition. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 20. Note that the
EU Regulation applies the stay of the main proceeding (article 4) while the Model Law
adopts the local stay. In articles 4 and 15 of the EU Regulation the English court found
that local law applied to pending arbitrations, although they speak of "lawsuits." That is
a plausible reading, but the current author would have been glad to see an exploration of
the policy arguments for a different interpretation.
38. See Westbrook, Coming Encounter, supra note 3, at 609.
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have suffered unjustified injury. 39 The Vivendi-Elektrim arbitration
award may have been quite correct, but it was for certain quite largealmost 62 billion. An award so large might elbow out all the other
creditors by its sheer size. If we suppose for argument's sake it were
twice as large as it would have been if properly defended, then the other
creditors would likely have been severely prejudiced. Of course, I have
no view whether the Elektrim award was accurate, nor do I know if the
case was well defended. The defense may have been excellent in fact.
The point is merely that if the case were not well defended because of the
factors mentioned above, the result would be seriously unjust to a large
number of innocent creditors of the debtor.40
The risk of flawed adjudication is sufficiently substantial by itself as
to justify some outside control over pending proceedings to avoid these
results. 4 1 That control might be exercised by the local court of the place
of arbitration, in direct response to notice of the opening of the
insolvency proceeding, or in response to a request from the foreign
insolvency court for assistance in the form of a temporary stay of the
arbitration. In appropriate circumstances, the insolvency court should
telephone, fax, or mail the local court,42 so that the local court can feel
confident in the justice of the request. Given the mutual trust required by
the legal structure of the EU,4 3 the local court would presumably grant
such a request almost always. Such a procedure granting a temporary,
provisional delay of the arbitration would deal with the first part of the
stay question as the case-management problem it really is.

39. See id.
40. The Armada court recognized the importance of the factors of ill-defended
claims and increased costs and delay. Armada 57. It ultimately gave the prize to
arbitration of the claims largely because they were governed by English law, and the
court wished not to "visit upon" the Swiss court the burden of applying English law. Id
61. The point may be well taken but would perhaps have been better weighed by the
Swiss court itself.
41. It was common ground in Armada under the Model Law and its application of
the English stay that the arbitration with the debtor was stayed pending the ruling of the
English court. Armada 21.
42. Again, I mean to include first resort to the arbitration tribunal when appropriate.
As to court-to-court contacts, direct communication between courts and administrators
has gone from being unknown to being increasingly accepted as a crucial part of the
management of multinational insolvencies. See Principles,supra note 6; Model Law,
supra note 8, arts. 25-26; Jay L. Westbrook, InternationalJudicialNegotiation, 38 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 567 (2003).
43. See Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFCS Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 2006 E.C.R.
1-3813, T 39-40.
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ARBITRATION ON THE MERITS

Once the arbitration has been delayed and the insolvency
administrator has had a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with
the case and to consult with arbitration counsel, the remaining issue is
whether the restraint of the arbitration proceeding should be lifted and
the merits of the claim should be resolved there rather than in the
insolvency court. The proper choice of applicable law determining that
point is the final question presented above.
Obviously, there would be no point in permitting an arbitration to be
commenced or a pending arbitration to proceed unless the results were
final on the merits.44 Enforcement of the award could be sought in the
insolvency court or in jurisdictions outside the country where the
insolvency is pending.
If enforcement is sought in the insolvency court, the award-creditor
would argue that its claim against a share of the insolvency assets was
conclusively established by the award. However, if the jurisdiction of
the insolvency proceeding would apply its own law and that law would
have insisted upon claims resolution through the court process, then it
seems quite possible that the insolvency court would not enforce the
arbitration award.4 5 If the insolvency court has control, directly or
through the cooperation of other courts, over substantially all of the
debtor's assets, the award will be worth very little. If the insolvency
court was an EU court and if it accepted the emerging English
interpretation of article 15 of the EU Insolvency Regulation, then it
might recognize the applicability of the law of the place of arbitration to
an arbitration pending at the time of opening the insolvency proceeding.
In that case it would enforce the award. On the other hand, it seems less
likely a non-EU court would accept the applicability of the local claimsarbitration rule when the arbitration likely violated the foreign court's
stay. 46 So as to the assets controlled in a non-EU insolvency proceeding,
the arbitration may well have been a waste of time and money.
On the other hand, if there are substantial assets located in the place
of arbitration, the award could be enforced against those assets. 47 In that
case, the local court would be permitting action directly against assets
under the legal control of the main proceeding in likely violation of the
44. That is, the results would be final subject only to the New York Convention
defenses. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V.
45. I confess to wondering if the English insolvency court would be entirely
sanguine about accepting a Polish award under the reverse circumstances.
46. See supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
47. The award might also be enforceable under the New York Convention in other
jurisdictions that elected not to cooperate with the main proceeding, if there were
substantial assets in such a jurisdiction.
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main proceeding's stay or moratorium.
That result would be
territorialism of the classic variety and therefore would likely be
repugnant to those jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom and indeed all
the EU member states, that have embraced the principle of modified
universalism.
The central point is that a jurisdiction's choice-of-law decision
about arbitration should be closely linked to its policy on recognition and
cooperation in insolvency matters. If a country takes a largely
territorialist view, with little deference to a foreign insolvency
proceeding pending in the debtor's home country, then its policy of
supporting arbitration should probably prevail unless a local insolvency
proceeding is filed. On the other hand, if a jurisdiction is committed to
some significant degree to modified universalism or at least close
international cooperation in multinational insolvencies, then the logic of
that commitment requires a global approach to claims resolution to the
maximum extent possible. If a local court permits arbitration to go
forward to an award and enforces that award against local assets, then it
has moved away from an international system back to the traditional
territorial regime in insolvency matters. If it refuses to enforce against
local assets and sends the arbitration award claimant to the insolvency
court, and that court refuses to accept the award as conclusive, the
arbitration will have cost everyone concerned much time and money for
nothing.
So it seems right to argue that a court with a commitment to
modified universalism in insolvency matters should apply the law of the
insolvency court with regard to the proper process for resolving claims or
should defer that decision to the insolvency court itself. If a company
based in New York enters insolvency there, the court at the place of
arbitration should in most cases adopt the American rule of usually
permitting arbitration to go forward (although after a temporary delay as
noted above), while in the case of a Warsaw-based company, the local
court should halt the arbitration and refer the claimant to the insolvency
court. Better still, in my view, in both situations the local court should
submit the whole question to the insolvency court to decide if arbitration
should be permitted.48
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the debtor prior to
insolvency may have entered into more than one arbitration contract
calling for arbitration in different jurisdictions, as in the case of Elektrim.

48. Cf. In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 747 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(validity of New York attachments obtained after the opening of Danish proceedings
referred to the Danish court for resolution). See also CSL Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Britannia
Bulkers Plc, 2009 WL 2876250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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If local law is applied to resolve the enforceability of the arbitration
clause, Elektrim demonstrates there will often be disparate results
unrelated to the merits of the claims. Only by applying the procedural
law of the insolvency court can it be assured that the same process will
be applied to similarly situated contract counterparties. Closely related is
the fact that parties can choose the place of arbitration and therefore
attempt to manipulate the procedural rules governing claims, especially if
the debtor company seems financially shaky at the time the contract is
written. It is much harder for a counterparty to influence the location of
the main insolvency proceeding and therefore the enforceability of the
Finally, and not least important, modem
arbitration clause.
reorganization procedures, which are crucial to preserving value for all
creditors in large global insolvencies, require a central oversight and
control of insolvency cases. The attempt to rescue a multinational often
will not survive a multiplication of procedures across a number of
national jurisdictions.
For all these reasons, it seems to me the best rules are that
temporary stays of arbitration should routinely be granted upon the
insolvency of one party and that the ultimate method of claims resolution
should be determined under the law of the insolvency court. In some
cases, the insolvency court should permit a pending arbitration to go
forward if it has progressed well down the road to a decision on the
merits, although preferably after a pause to permit the insolvency
administrator to defend the claim properly.
Modified universalism has come to be viewed as the most desirable
(or the least undesirable) of the possible approaches to multinational
insolvencies. The logic of that approach-and the fact of globalization
that underlies its rationale-leads almost always to the conclusion that
the law of the main insolvency proceeding should be chosen to govern
the various legal issues that may arise concerning the debtor and its
assets. 49 Thus it is not surprising that a close analysis leads to the same
result here.

49. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global
Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Avoidance Of
Pre-Bankruptcy TransactionsIn MultinationalBankruptcy Cases, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 899
(2007).

